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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his judgment of conviction for first
degree murder, enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. He asserts that the district
court erred by granting the State's motion for reconsideration and holding that the
federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act superceded Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a),
erred by admitting unfairly prejudicial photographs of the victim's wounds, and erred by
failing to conduct a 404(b) analysis of text messages admitted at trial. He also asserts
that that the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error,
when he offered facts not supported by.. the evidence during his closing argument and
that the prosecutor violated his right to due process by failing to correct false testimony
at trial. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new
trial because Mr. Branigh establish a Brady violation and because the court applied the
incorrect standard pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 1. 2007, Michael Johnston was shot and killed. (Tr., p.661, Ls.1215.)

Nobody could ever identify the shooter.

(See generally, Tr.)

Kendra Parker

testified that she lived on the southeast corner of 11 th Street and Cedar Avenue in
Lewiston.

(Tr., p.602, Ls.11-17.)

At around 10:20 to 10:30, she realized she had

forgotten some laundry in her car and she went outside to retrieve it. (Tr., p.603, Ls.15.) She saw a white car idling in the intersection. (Tr., p.603, LsA-5.) She watched the
vehicle and then heard a male voice saying something like, "I'm right here, man, I'm
right over here."

(Tr., p.603, Ls.6-8.)

The voice was not confrontational, so she
1

proceeded to her car. (Tr., p.603, Ls.8-10.) She then heard a gunshot and crouched;
there was a pause of roughly 3-5 seconds, and then 4-5 gunshots in rapid succession.
(Tr., p.603, Ls.10-14.) She testified that, as she was standing up, she could see the
light of a gun illuminating the interior of the car through the slats in her fence.
(Tr., p.603, Ls.14-17.) After the last shot, somebody said, "oh, shit, man," and the car
then "gently accelerated toward Thain [Street]." (Tr., p.603, Ls.18-22.) She ran inside
and called 911. (Tr., p.603, Ls.21-22.) Although she was not very good with cars, she
testified that she believed the white vehicle was a Camaro. (Tr., p.604, Ls.19-21.) This
happened about 60-70 feet away. (Tr., p.606, Ls.12-13.)
Brian Hodge testified that on that night, he drove onto 11th Street and saw a car
up at the "next little alley street," on the right side of the road with its headlights facing
him.

(Tr., p.621, Ls.6-13.) Just after he drove through the intersection, he heard a

series of gunshots. (Tr., p.621, Ls.20-21.) It sounded like the shots came from a pistol;
Mr. Hodge saw no muzzle flashes. (Tr., p.622, Ls.12-16.) The car then pulled away to
the correct side of the road and drove away. (Tr., p.624, Ls.1-4.) He believed that the
vehicle was a mid-1980's Iroc Camaro with a dent on the front driver's side fender.
(Tr., p.625, Ls.1-14.) Mr. Hodge also told Corporal Joedy Mundell that he, "saw a male
suspect just west of the vehicle's location who appeared to be walking or running west
on Cedar Avenue." (Tr., p.707, Ls.21-23.)
Doug Bolton testified that on that evening he was watching television with his
wife and heard gunshots after 10:00. (Tr., p.631, Ls.23-25.) He looked out the window
and saw muzzle flashes against the house across the street. (Tr., p.632, Ls.11-15.) He
ran outside and saw Mike Johnston holding his breath; according to Mr. Bolton,
Mr. Johnston stated that he was shot by a guy in a white car up at the corner.
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(Tr.,p.632, Ls.11-15.)

Mr. Johnston asked Mr. Bolton if he could take him to the

hospital; Mr. Bolton told him he would call an ambulance and Mr. Johnston sat on the
porch. (Tr., p.634, Ls.19-25.) The police arrived in approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
(Tr., p.638, Ls.22-25.)
Dr. Jay Hunter was working in the emergency room that night. (Tr., p.645, Ls.2123.) When Mr. Johnston was brought in, he started IVs, did a chest x-ray, and inserted
a chest tube to drain the blood.

(Tr., p.646, Ls.7-10.)

The State submitted, over

Mr. Branigh's objection, two photographs of bullet wounds and a photograph of the
drainage from the chest tube. (Tr., p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.11.) Mr. Johnston eventually
died from "hemorrhagic shock, he bled to death." (Tr., p.651, LA.) The coroner, Gary
Gilliam, concluded that Mr. Johnston's death was a homicide and the cause of death
was a gun shot wound to the right chest. (Tr., p.661, Ls.12-15.)
Mr. Branigh was idenitied as a possible suspect.

Desiree Anderson, who had

been married to Mr. Johnston, met Mr. Branigh in March of 2007. (Tr., pA81, Ls.8-9.)
She met Mr. Branigh through her sister and thought he was a "really nice guy, really
easy to talk to." (Tr., pA81, Ls.16-25.) She was divorced from Mr. Johnston at this
time, but the two of them had discussed getting back together. (Tr., pA79, Ls.6-8.) She
began dating Mr. Branigh when Mr. Johnston and their children were on a trip to
Vermont; when he returned, she told him that "he was kind of like a day late and a dollar
short because I had started seeing someone." (Tr., p.482, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Johnston was
upset because he came back from his trip wanting to get back together. (Tr., pA82,
Ls.22-23.)
Eventually, Ms. Anderson decided to quit seeing Mr. Branigh and try to work
things out with Mr. Johnston. (Tr., pA87, Ls.10-20.) She stated that she came to this
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conclusion in August. (Tr., pA90, Ls.12-24.) She went to see Mr. Branigh sometime
between September 6 and 11 to see how he was doing with the breakup and she ended
up sleeping with him.

(Tr., p.491, Ls.6-11.)

Ms. Anderson stated that, after that

encounter, she did not believe she had communicated with Mr. Branigh with anything
other than text messages.

(Tr., p.491, Ls.21-22.)

Ms. Anderson believed that

Mr. Branigh thought that Mr. Johnston was controlling and abusive to her; she testified
that Mr. Johnston grabbed her arms one time and that she had once bit him during a
fight. (Tr., p.492, L.19 - p.493, L.3.)
Ms. Anderson testified that sometime during the first part of September, she and
Mr, Branigh got in her car and he would not get out.

(Tr., p.496, Ls.1-7.)

He said

something to the effect of, "do you want to get your neck snapped?" and she told him
that she wasn't going to see him anymore. (Tr., pA96, Ls.12-15.) Someone overheard
the argument and called the police; the police told her to stay away from him and she
went home. (Tr., pA97, LsA-10.)
On October 1, 2007, she had the day off and was sleeping in the afternoon when
she awoke to pounding on the doors and walls. (Tr., pA99, Ls.19-25.) Mr. Johnston
was at work. (Tr., pA99, Ls,19-20.) Mr. Branigh was outside knocking on the door and
would not stop so she eventually called 911. (Tr., p.500, Ls.1-6.) An officer arrived and
Mr. Branigh left. (Tr., p.500, Ls.5-S.) She called Mr. Johnston, who came home from
work while she went to the courthouse to pick up papers to file a protection order.
(Tr., p.500, Ls.5-12.) That evening, Mr. Johnston was walking outside by the house to
see if Mr. Branigh was coming back in order to document his behavior.
Ls.13-21.)

(Tr., p.504,

During the day, Ms. Anderson received text messages from both

Mr. Johnston's and Mr. Branigh's telephone numbers. (Tr., p.504, Ls.22-25.) At trial
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the State sought to introduce State's Exhibit 4, a sixty-six page document containing the
contents of text messages that Ms. Anderson testified she received and sent.
(Tr., p.510, Ls.1-25; State's Exhibit 4.) Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of IRE 404(b),
and the district court overruled this objection, stating that "I've also not been cited
anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that objection is overruled." (Tr., p.515, LS.1520.)
Gina Barton testified that on October 1, 2007, at around 2:30 or 3:00 p.m., she
saw Mr. Branigh driving around Powers and 10th Street, driving quickly and text
messaging.

(Tr., p.590, LS.8 - p.591, L.23.)

She identified the vehicle pictured in

State's exhibits 9, 10, 11, and 12 as Mr. Branigh's vehicle.

(Tr., p.593, Ls.15-20.)

Dawn Gump testified that on that same evening, she was walking near 11th and Cedar
and saw an older style Camaro driving erratically toward her. (Tr., p.598, Ls.1-10.) She
identified the driver as Mr. Branigh and identified the vehicle in State's exhibits 9, 10,
11, and 12 as Mr. Branigh's vehicle. (Tr., p.598, Ls.14-25.)
Later on the evening of October 1, Jonathan Coe, a patrolman for the Clarkston
Police Department, received an alert from dispatch that a vehicle matching the
descriptions above had just turned off of Red Wolf Bridge onto Highway 12. (Tr., p.674,
Ls.1-6.) The officer found the vehicle and performed a U-turn to catch up. (Tr., p.677,
Ls.22-25.)

The officer followed the vehicle while waiting for other units to join him.

(Tr., p.678, Ls.10-14.) Officer Coe testified that he followed the vehicle for a while, but
at one point, the vehicle, "turned north, [and] he gunned it and he went - he sped up
quickly." (Tr., p.679, Ls.16-21.) The officer followed the vehicle at speeds up to 70
miles per hour; after the vehicle drove back into Lewiston, officer Coe was passed by
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either a Lewiston or Nez Perce County officer and he pulled off, because the chase
went outside his jurisdiction. (Tr., p.680, Ls.1-18.)
Corporal Joedy Mundell testified that, after visiting the site of the shooting, he
joined the pursuit, and that after following the vehicle to Thain Street, he heard shooting.
(Tr., p.696, Ls.18-25.) Eventually, the vehicle stopped; Mr. Branigh, who was driving
the vehicle, refused to exit the vehicle.

(Tr., p. 697, Ls.8-18.)

Mr. Branigh was

eventually pulled from the vehicle, tased, and placed in handcuffs. (Tr., p.697, Ls.8-23.)
Mr. Branigh spoke to Corporal Mundell that evening and told him he had been
driving around extensively throughout the area that day. (Tr., p.701, Ls.10-21.) He told
the officer that he had been romantically involved with Ms. Anderson but denied that
there had been any kind of altercation between himself and Mr. Johnston. (Tr., p.701,
Ls.10-21.) Mr. Branigh did not recall being near the area of 11 th and Cedar between 10
and 11 p.m. that night, but said it was possible that he had been there.

(Tr., p.701,

Ls.17-21.) On cross-examination, Corporal Mundell acknowledged that Mr. Branigh had
told him he had been at that area earlier in the day when it was still daylight and that
later in the evening was driving around elsewhere.

(Tr., p.717, Ls.5-22.)

He also

acknowledged that Mr. Branigh told him that he did not know what had happened, and
that he did not think that Mr. Johnston deserved to die. (Tr., p.720, Ls.13-23.)
Mr. Branigh told Corporal Mundell that he thought Mr. Johnston was a danger to
Ms. Anderson, and that he would both die for, and kill for, Ms. Anderson. (Tr., p.702,
Ls.12-25.) He stated that he had failed to stop for the officers that evening because he
had been pulled over before when there were no problems and the officers had "pissed
him off." (Tr., p.702, Ls.19-25.) Corporal Mundell told Mr. Branigh that Mr. Johnston
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had died and Mr. Branigh cried.

(Tr., p.704, Ls.21-22.) No weapons were found on

Mr. Branigh that evening. (Tr., p.721, Ls.1-6.)
Officer Brian Birdsell obtained a search warrant for Mr. Branigh's vehicle and
found no weapons or shell casings.

(Tr., p.740, Ls.1-20.) Officer Birdsell found two

cellular telephones; one matched a phone registered to Mr. Branigh; the other belonged
to an R. Kelly, and Officer Birdsell never discovered who that person was. (Tr., p.740,
Ls.14-20.)
No testing was done for gun powder residue either in the vehicle or on
Mr. Branigh. (Tr., p.780, L.17 - p.781, L.10.) At trial, Officer Birdsell testified that, "our
state lab doesn't test gun powder residue." (Tr., p.781, Ls.20-24.)

However, during

closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following representation to the jury:
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was no
gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell
told you the lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove
anything. They result in a false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot,
all that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You
can't identify the gun, which it was anything like that. And so they have
taken the positive they will no longer do the testing.
So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case there
wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things you might see on CSI, you
know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the sidewalk, no.
You know, No.1, it takes over a year in real world time to get the DNA
evidence back.
(Tr., p.1 023, L.25 -p.1024, L.17.) During rebuttal, he said more:
GSR (gun shot residue) transfer is one of the biggest problems that makes
it unreliable. And its situations where there is gunshots, it's highly likely
that there's more than one gun involved. So if they found gun shot
residue, it wouldn't have said anything.
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that that
was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any more
than it was evidence that it was GSR transfer from all the - well, as a
matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun shot
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residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of them
takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle their
guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons that
are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the
Defendant regardless of what he says.
(Tr., p.1040, Ls.7-22.) None of this is supported by evidence adduced at trial.
Officer Birdsell also investigated the scene of the shooting.

There was a

distance of 284 feet from where Ms. Parker saw the vehicle and where Mr. Hodges
drove by the white vehicle. (Tr., p.745, Ls.15-17.)

Mr. Johnston's blood trail did not

begin at the intersection, but began down the street at 1034 Cedar Avenue. (Tr., p.745,
Ls.8-9.)

State's exhibit 42 was offered as an aerial depiction of these areas and

distances. (State's Exhibit 42.)
Officer Birdsell next testified he met Steven Peak in mid-2007 while investigating
commercial burglaries throughout Lewiston. (Tr., p.757, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Peak was charged
with possession of stolen property based on Officer Birdsell's investigation. (Tr., p.757,
Ls.11-13.) Officer Birdsell also sought Mr. Peak's cooperation in the burglary cases and
Mr. Peak supplied him with reliable information.

(Tr., p.758, Ls.9-11.)

Mr. Peak

received a benefit from his cooperation in that the judge in a juvenile matter told him his
cooperation would be given consideration in a probation violation proceeding.
(Tr., p.758, Ls.18-24.)
On February 21, 2008, Officer Birdsell was contacted by a jailer at the Nez Perce
County Jail, who advised him that Mr. Peak wanted to speak with him. (Tr., p.759, LS.712.) During the subsequent conversation, Mr. Peak described a series of conversations
he claimed he had had with Mr. Branigh. (Tr., p.759, Ls.14-23.) As a result of those
discussions, Officer Birdsell arranged for a meeting with him, Mr. Peak, Sergeant Jeff
Arneson, and the prosecutor in this case, Dan Spickler. (Tr., p.760, Ls.17-24.) Officer
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Birdsell told Mr. Peak that he would "talk to the judge and tell him that he was being
cooperative and helping us in another investigation."

(Tr., p.761, Ls.19-20.)

When

Mr. Branigh asked Officer Birdsell if he was aware that Mr. Peak had some interaction
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the prosecutor objected on the basis that the
question was outside the scope of direct examination. (Tr., p.787, Ls.12-20.)
Ryan Harger, the custodian of records for Sprint Nextel in Overland Park,
Kansas, testified in order to authenticate the records obtained from Sprint. (Tr., p.788,
L.10 - p.805, L.2.) Mr. Branigh objected on the bases of relevance, IRE 404(b), and
undue prejudice, IRE 403. (Tr., p.804, Ls.11-18.) The court overruled the objections,
and the records were admitted as State's Exhibit 64. (Tr., p.805, Ls.1-2.)
Officer Brandon Hopple, of the Lewiston Police Department, testified that he
gathered information relating to Mr. Branigh's, Ms. Anderson's, and Mr. Johnston's
cellular telephones; according to Officer Hopple, messages were received on
Mr. Johnston's phone from the number associated with Mr. Branigh's phone until
October 3, 2007, two days after Mr. Johnston's death and Mr. Branigh's arrest.
(Tr., p.818, Ls.1-23.) Officer Hopple testified that he could not say the messages were
physically there when he seized Mr. Johnston's phone; the phone had lost power and
needed to be recharged, and once it was charged, the messages appeared.
(Tr., p.821, Ls.5-8.)
Steven Peak then testified that he became acquainted with Mr. Branigh while
they were incarcerated. (Tr., p.874, Ls.1-11.) The first thing they talked about was the
fact that Mr. Peak had taken pictures of Mr. Branigh the night he was arrested.
(Tr., p.874, Ls.19-20.)

Mr. Peak testified that, eventually, Mr. Branigh discussed

"conspiracy theories" about Mr. Johnston's death - theories about how the police or
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Ms. Anderson were responsible.

(Tr., p.876, Ls.10-13.)

Mr. Peak stated that

Mr. Branigh told him that Ms. Anderson had told him they only way he and
Ms. Anderson could be together was if Mr. Johnston was out of the picture and that the
only reason she was still with Mr. Johnston was because of the kids. (Tr., p.876, Ls.1622.)

Mr. Peak claimed that Mr. Branigh told him that the medical authorities did not

know which wound was the entrance wound and which wound was the exit wound, and
that, "he was the one that knew the answer." (Tr., p.878, Ls.7-11.) Mr. Branigh also
allegedly stated that Mr. Johnston "doesn't look so tough frozen in a body bag."
(Tr., p.879, L.25 - p.880, L 1.)
Regarding text messages sent the evening of Mr. Johnston's death, Mr. Peak
testified that Mr. Branigh stated that he thought Ms. Anderson might have been texting
him from Mr. Johnston's phone when he thought he was texting Mr. Johnston, and he
noted that while a witness claimed she had seen his car from over a fence line, she
would not have been able to see his car from there. (Tr., p.881, Ls.16-24.) Further,
according to Mr. Peak, Mr. Branigh told him that he "went up the old spiral highway
around a corner," and buried his gun there. (Tr., p.882, Ls.6-9.) However, the police
searched this area and no guns were ever found.

(Tr., p.936, Ls.12-25.)

In fact,

nothing associated with firearms at all was even found at Mr. Branigh's residence.
(Tr., p.974, Ls.8-14.)
Mr. Peak stated that Mr. Branigh told him that he had drinks with Mr. Johnston
once and Mr. Johnston asked Mr. Branigh to kill him and bury him in the woods
because he was depressed and wanted to die. (Tr., p.884, Ls.7-12.) Mr. Branigh also
asked Mr. Peak if he knew what euthanasia was and if it was legal in Idaho. (Tr., p.884,
Ls.15-24.)
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Mr. Peak testified that as Mr. Branigh was showing him pictures of the scene of
the shooting, Mr. Branigh noted how there were hearts on the brick tiles and that it
would be a good place to die. (Tr., p.885, Ls.2-10.) Mr. Branigh also allegedly stated
that he had always wondered what would go through a person's mind right before he
died, and that he wished he would have "stuck around." (Tr., p.885, Ls.6-10.) At one
point, Mr. Peak claimed that he told Mr. Branigh that he thought Mr. Branigh had told
him that his phone was stolen, and Mr. Branigh smiled and said, "it was." (Tr., p.885,
Ls.12-1?)

When Mr. Peak asked Mr. Branigh what happened on the night of

Mr. Johnston's death, Mr. Branigh, "told me that when he was driving home a car came
behind him, and he continued to drive. And he didn't - he didn't say - he didn't really
say why he didn't stop really. Not that I - he just went into it like just was the next thing,
just that he was driving away from the police."

(Tr., p.886, Ls.10-18.)

Mr. Branigh

allegedly told him that that he wanted to drive to an area where there would be
cameras, because he believed the police would try to shoot him, and that he would
drive toward his father's house because his father wanted to see him die. (Tr., p.88?,
Ls.1-5.) Mr. Branigh allegedly said that he purchased high octane gas because it would
make his car go faster.

(Tr., p.888, Ls.1-2.)

When asked why he was testifying,

Mr. Peak stated that he felt like something wrong was done and it was the right thing to
do. (Tr., p.888, Ls.12-15.)
On cross-examination, when asked if he knew Jim Dorian, Mr. Peak replied, "he
was the resource officer at my school." (Tr., p.891, Ls.1-5.) When asked if he had
spoken to an FBI Agent Hart about this case, Mr. Peak stated that he had spoken to him
about "an incident with a laser and an airplane," and that he brought up this case with
Agent Hart, who stated he was not there for that. (Tr., p.896, Ls.9-20.) The prosecutor
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objected to this line of questioning as irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct
examination. (Tr., p.896, Ls.19-25.) The court overruled the objection, and Mr. Peak
stated that Agent Hart made it clear that he did not want any details about this case
discussed with him. (Tr., p.897, Ls.12-19.)
Mr. Branigh was charged with one count of murder in the first degree and one
count of eluding. (R., p.64.) The State sought an enhancement for the use of a firearm
or a deadly weapon. (R., p.66.) Mr. Branigh moved to sever the eluding charge; the
district court granted this motion. (R., pp.76, 147.)
Mr. Branigh filed a First Motion in Limine, seeking to exclude any evidence
gathered from the Spring Nextel Corporation concerning his cell phone records.
(R., p.306.) He asserted that his 4th and 14th Amendments rights, as well as his rights
pursuant to Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated. (R., pp.306-07.) He
asserted that the State: 1) served an Idaho search warrant out-of-state; 2) served an
invalid search warrant in the wrong state; and 3) illegally served a search warrant and
filed a return before the search warrant was filed with the Court. (R., p.307.) He filed a
memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pA96.)
The district court granted the motion and excluded the evidence.

(R., p.754.)

The State then filed a motion for reconsideration. (R., p.763.) The court reconsidered
its decision and denied the motion in limine. (Tr., p.231, Ls.9-13.)
Mr. Branigh filed a Second Motion in Limine, seeking to exclude any prior acts
evidence without first obtaining permission of the court outside the presence of the jury.
(R., p.531.) The court granted this motion. (Tr., p.183, LsA-22.)
Mr. Branigh was found guilty of first degree murder. (R., p.941.) The jury also
found that he used a firearm in the commission of the crime. (R., p.942.) The district
12

court imposed a determinate life sentence for murder and fifteen years determinate for
use of the firearm. (R, p.1070.) Mr. Branigh appealed. (R, p.1082.)
Following his sentencing, Mr. Branigh filed a motion seeking a new trial based
upon new evidence that Mr. Branigh alleged was withheld by the State in violation of
Brady v. Maryland. 1 (R., p.1 088; Supp. R, pp.197-208.) In conjunction with his motion,

Mr. Branigh requested that the State produce a copy of "any and all reports from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Idaho State Police and any other law enforcement
agency regarding Stephen Peak, Jim Dorion and Dan Spickler." (Supp. R, p.28.) The
State resisted this request and filed a motion for a protective order, claiming that the
information that Mr. Branigh was seeking was irrelevant and not related to any purpose
relating to his motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, p.31.) The prosecutor, Daniel Spickler,
further claimed that all materials in the State's possession had already been disclosed
to Mr. Branigh; that the investigation of former Sheriff Dorion was not related to
Mr. Branigh's case; and that the prosecutor's office was not involved in the investigation
of the former Sheriff. (Supp. R, pp.31-32.) The district court denied the State's motion
for a protective order and ordered the State to turn over the information requested by
Mr. Branigh. (Supp. R, pp.41-44.)
During the pendency of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial or for reconsideration
of the denial of his prior request for a new trial, his trial counsel sought to withdraw from
his representation of Mr. Branigh due to an alleged deterioration of the attorney-client
relationship.

(Supp. R., pp.170-171.)

As a result of this request, the district court

appointed Mr. Branigh a new attorney to assist him in presenting his motion for a new
trial. (Supp. R, pp.173-174.)

1

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Through his newly appointed counsel, Mr. Branigh filed a brief in support of his
motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, p.197.) He noted within this brief that, prior to trial, he
had specifically requested that the State disclose to the defense all exculpatory
information and all material required to be disclosed under Brady. (Supp. R, p.19S.)
Despite this request, Mr. Branigh noted that none of the information regarding
Mr. Peak's special relationship with former Sheriff Dorion was ever disclosed to the
defense, nor was the fact that Mr. Peak apparently had special access through Dorion
to law enforcement databases. (Supp. R., pp.19S-200.)
In his brief, Mr. Branigh argued that the failure to disclose information regarding
Mr. Peak's involvement with former Sheriff Dorion, along with information that Mr. Peak
had special access to a law enforcement database, constituted a Brady violation that
entitled Mr. Branigh to a new trial.

(Supp. R, pp.201-202.)

In the alternative,

Mr. Branigh asserted that this constituted newly discovered evidence pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2406(7), that entitled him to a new trial. (Supp. R, pp.202-20S.)
Mr. Spickler thereafter filed a motion asking that the district court quash the
subpoenas that were issued for himself and a member of the support staff of the Nez
Perce County Prosecutor's Office, who were both present for a meeting with federal
agents regarding Mr. Peak's involvement with former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. R, pp.214371-394.)

The prosecutor asked, in the alternative, to be permitted to continue to

represent the State in Mr. Branigh's case even if he were to be called as a witness in
the case. (Supp. R., pp.373-374.)
The district court held a hearing on the State's motion seeking to quash the
subpoenas for the prosecutor and one of his staff members. (Supp. Tr., p.6, Ls.2-11.)
At this hearing, Mr. Spickler characterized the reports he had received from Nez Perce
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law enforcement regarding the involvement between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion
as "rumors," and, further, took the position "that rumors can never rise to the level of a
Brady violation."

(Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.10-18.)

The prosecutor classified defense

counsel's efforts to obtain the prosecutor's testimony as, "just a fishing expedition,"
despite evidence that Mr. Spickler himself: approached federal agents with concerns
about the relationship between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion; expressed his own
concerns about this relationship, along with those of other law enforcement agents;
provided federal agents with a list of names of people who could provide information
about this improper relationship; and agreed with the federal agent that this information
was so serious that the "proper action" was to request that the Idaho State Attorney
General's Office "take over the matter for potential prosecution." (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-6;
Supp. R., pp.214-216.)
The district court disagreed with the State's characterization of the subpoenas as
a "fishing expedition," in light of the fact that Mr. Branigh had raised a potential Brady
violation among his grounds for requesting a new trial. (Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.6-12.) The
court particularly noted that the potential knowledge of Mr. Spickler, as the prosecutor in
Mr. Branigh's case, was among the issues at stake in such a claim. (Supp. Tr., p.18,
Ls.12-20.)

Accordingly, the district court denied the State's motion to quash the

subpoenas issued by Mr. Branigh, but granted Mr. Spickler's request to remain on the
case and to continue to represent the State. (Supp. Tr., p.19, L.5 - p.20, L.6.)
Mr. Spickler eventually testified at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new
trial. (Supp. Tr., p.35, Ls.13-19.) He testified that he was the head of the Nez Perce
County Prosecutor's Office, as well as the prosecutor for Mr. Branigh's underlying
criminal case. (Supp. Tr., p.35, Ls.16-24.) According to Mr. Spickler, he had informed
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federal agents who were investigating former Sheriff Dorion about reports that he had
received regarding Mr. Peak being given access to a law enforcement database through
former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.37, L.17 - p.38, L2.) Mr. Spickler also confirmed
that a number of people had spoken to him at that time about the close personal
relationship between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff.

(Supp. Tr., p.38, Ls.3-6.)

Following this meeting with federal agents, Mr. Spickler was aware that there was an
on-going investigation of former Sheriff Dorion that directly involved Mr. Peak. (Supp.
Tr., p.39, Ls.18-24.)
It was about three months after the meeting between Mr. Spickler and a federal
agent that Mr. Peak approached the State and offered to testify against Mr. Branigh at
trial. (Supp. Tr., p.40, Ls.3-25.) Mr. Spickler was aware at this time that Mr. Branigh
had specifically requested disclosure of all Brady material as part of his discovery
request.

(Supp. Tr., p.41, Ls.1-23.)

However, Mr. Spickler did not reveal this

information about Mr. Peak because the prosecutor characterized the information he
had obtained as "a rumor" which the prosecutor did not believe qualified as Brady
material. (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.2.)
Mr. Spickler did not request that the federal agencies involved in investigating
former Sheriff Dorion provide any documentation or forward any requests for discovery
on Mr. Branigh's behalf until after Mr. Branigh filed his motion for a new trial following
his conviction. (Supp. Tr., p.42, Ls.6-20.) This was despite the fact that Mr. Spickler
was aware of this investigation prior to and during Mr. Branigh's trial. (Supp. Tr., p.42,
Ls.21-25.) The prosecutor also asserted his personal belief that impeachment evidence
is not considered Brady material unless the impeachment evidence "leads to
exculpatory evidence." (Supp. Tr., p.49, L.19 - p.50, L.2.)
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Mr. Branigh then called Officer Charlie Spencer, who is an investigations
lieutenant with the Idaho State Police, to the witness stand. (Supp. Tr., p.51, L.18 p.52, L.6.) Officer Spencer was involved in the investigation of former Sheriff Dorion.
(Supp. Tr., p.52, Ls.14-25.)

In this capacity, the officer testified that his initial

involvement was to obtain permission "both from our agency and from the Nez Perce
County Prosecutor Dan Spickler for us to move forward with the investigation." (Supp.
Tr., p.52, Ls.19-24.)

Officer Spencer testified that he was present at the meeting

between federal agents and Mr. Spickler regarding the relationship between Mr. Peak
and former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.53, Ls.1-11.)
The officer further testified that Mr. Spickler was informed of the investigation into
Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff at this meeting.

(Supp. Tr., p.53, Ls.12-25.)

Mr. Spickler personally provided information to both Officer Spencer and to the federal
agent investigating the case.

(Supp. Tr., p.54, Ls.12-14.) According to Officer

Spencer's testimony, the investigation of the relationship between former Sheriff Dorion
and Mr. Peak was part of a confidential investigation during the pendency of
Mr. Branigh's trial. (Supp. Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, L.15.) Therefore the officer testified
that he was unaware of any way that Mr. Branigh could have learned of the information
that was revealed through this investigation, including the allegation that Mr. Peak had
been granted access to a law enforcement database through his connection with former
Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.56, L.16 - p.57, L.2.)
Another detective with the Idaho State Police, Edward Westbrook, also testified
at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial. (Supp. Tr., p.60, LsA-9.) As with
Officer Spencer, the detective was involved with the investigation into the relationship
between former Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak.
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(Supp. Tr., p.60, Ls.12-21.)

In

conjunction with this investigation, Detective Westbrook was aware that Mr. Peak had
made numerous phone calls to former Sheriff Dorion.

(Supp. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.70,

L.6.) Many of these conversations involved either requests on the part of Mr. Peak for
the former Sheriff to assist Mr. Peak in avoiding prison time or actual references to
Mr. Branigh's case. (Supp. Tr., p.63, L.19 - p.70, L.6; Supp. Ex., pp.69-76.) Notably,
two of these phone conversations involved discussions of Mr. Peak being placed in the
same jail cell as Mr. Branigh; and, in one conversation, the former Sheriff instructed
Mr. Peak not to discuss matters relating to Mr. Branigh on the phone. (Supp. Ex., p.76.)
Former Sheriff Dorion had previously warned Mr. Peak about the fact that their
conversations while he was incarcerated were being recorded. (Supp. Ex., p.69.)
Mr. Peak also testified at this hearing. (Supp Tr., p.79, Ls.17-19.) When asked
about his relationship with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak characterized Mr. Dorion as
his friend.

(Supp. Tr., p.80, Ls. 16-19.)

He further testified that, contrary to his

testimony at trial, the two were more than mere acquaintances. (Supp. Tr., p.80, Ls.2024.) In the course of this friendship, Mr. Peak testified, he made several phone calls
and met privately with the former Sheriff more times than he could recall.
Tr., p.81, L.5 - p.86, L.19.)

(Supp.

During these phone calls, Mr. Peak would ask former

Sheriff Dorion for help in avoiding prison for Mr. Peak's charged crimes.

(Supp.

Tr., p.83, Ls.13-17.) At the end of at least one of these conversations, Mr. Peak and
former Sheriff Dorion both stated, "I love yoU.,,2 (Supp. Tr., p.84, Ls.16-19; Supp Ex.,
p.72.)

Former Sheriff Dorion actually ended several of these recorded phone conversations
by expressing his love for Mr. Peak. (Supp. Ex., pp.69-70, 72.)

2
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Mr. Peak also admitted that he and the former Sheriff had conversations
regarding Mr. Branigh.

(Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.1-3; Supp. Ex., p.76.)

In one of the

recorded phone conversations, former Sheriff Dorion cut Mr. Peak off after he
mentioned Mr. Branigh and cautioned Mr. Peak not to say anything about Mr. Branigh
on the phone. (Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.11-21; Supp. Ex., p.76.) The former Sheriff said that
he would try to help Mr. Peak avoid prison. (Supp. Tr., p.88, L.20 - p.89, L.1.)
During the course of this hearing, Mr. Peak admitted to having lied to federal
agents about whether he had personally accessed the law enforcement database.
(Supp. Tr., p.89, L.12 - p.98, L.9.) He admitted at the hearing that he had actually been
able to access the law enforcement database for the Nez Perce County Sheriff's Office
on his own "over a dozen times." (Supp. Tr., p.89, Ls.12-23.) Although he was not
given a password for this database, Mr. Peak would simply use the system whenever
another police officer had left the program open on a computer. (Supp. Tr., p.90, LS.717.) Mr. Peak was familiar enough with the system that he was able to navigate the
database on his own. (Supp. Tr., p.90, Ls.15-17.) He did, however, continue to deny
that he looked up information about Mr. Branigh's case using the database or that his
testimony was based upon information other than that provided to him by Mr. Branigh.
(Supp. Tr., p.91, L.14 - p.96, L.12.)
Finally, Mr. Branigh testified in support of his motion requesting a new trial.
(Supp. Tr., p.99, Ls.4-7.) He testified that the first time that he learned of the special
relationship between former Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak was after he had already been
sentenced for murder when he received a newspaper article from his former trial
counsel.

(Supp. Tr., p.99, L.10 - p.100, L.3.)

Mr. Branigh did not receive these

materials until November, 2009. (Supp. Tr., p.101, Ls.1-10.)
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The State then presented the testimony of Officer Birdsell.

(Supp. Tr., p.102,

Ls.19-21.) Officer Birdsell testified that he was aware of the allegations that Mr. Peak
had personally accessed the law enforcement database at the Sheriff's office and had
investigated these allegations.

(Supp. Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.104, L.6.)

The officer

testified that, upon reviewing the information contained in the law enforcement
database, much of the information provided by Mr. Peak was not contained on the
database. (Supp. Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.112, L.6.) The officer also testified about a letter
written by Mr. Branigh, which was admitted into evidence at this hearing, in which
Mr. Branigh acknowledged making statements to Mr. Peak regarding his case, but
claimed that he made the statements up in order to mislead the police.

(Supp.

Tr., p.120, L.22 - p.122, L.22.)
The district court initially took Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial under
advisement, but subsequently denied it. (Supp. Tr., p.146, Ls.22-24; Supp. R, pp.467480.) However, in the district court's order, it actually merged its analysis of whether
Mr. Branigh was entitled to a new trial in light of the Brady violation that occurred in this
case with the standards for whether he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 192406 - and analyzed the question of whether Mr. Branigh was entitled to a new trial
based upon whether he had met both sets of standards cumulatively.

(Supp.

R, pp.481.) In addition, the court framed its analysis as to whether Mr. Branigh had
demonstrated the requisite prejudice in terms of the sufficiency of the remaining
evidence to support his conviction in finding that Mr. Branigh was not entitled to a new
trial. (Supp. R, pp.479-480.)
Thereafter, Mr. Branigh filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the district
court's denial of his motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, pp.483-484.) In a brief filed in
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support of this motion, Mr. Branigh noted for the district court that a different standard
for prejudice applied to his claims pursuant to Brady than those made pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.492-494.) The district court denied this motion, once
again reiterating the court's belief that, "the remaining evidence is clearly sufficient to
support the jury's verdict." (Supp. R., pp.517-519.)
Mr. Branigh timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.
(R., p.1082.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for reconsideration of its
decision that the search warrant for Mr. Branigh's cellular phone records was
unlawfully executed?

2.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence regarding all of the text messages
in this case because the district court failed to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis?

3.

Did the district court err by admitting State's exhibits 32, 33, and 34, because
their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice?

4,

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error,
when he presented argument to the jury that was not supported by evidence
presented at trial?

5,

Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Branigh's right to due process when the prosecutor
failed to correct false testimony presented by one of the state's witnesses at trial?

6.

Did the district court err, and and deny Mr. Branigh's due process right to a fair
trial, when the court denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial based upon the
Brady violation that occurred in this case?

7.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406 because the district court failed to apply the correct
legal standards to this claim?
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I.

The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of Its
Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records Was
Unlawfully Executed
Introduction

A.

Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court properly concluded that his cellular
telephone records were inadmissible and erred in granting the State's motion for
reconsideration and concluding that 18 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. expanded the scope of an
Idaho magistrate's authority in authorizing a search warrant. Mr. Branigh contends that
the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and unlawfully executed, and thus the
district court's initial decision to suppress the records obtained by the warrant was
correct.

B.

The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of
Its Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records
Was Unlawfully Executed
Prior to trial, Mr. Branigh filed a motion in limine to exclude cell phone records

obtained from Sprint Nextel Corporate Security. The district court made the following
factual findings regarding this motion, which Mr. Branigh does not contest on appeal: A
Lewiston City police officer contacted the local Nextel-Sprint office to inquire about
obtaining the cell phone records of Mr. Branigh. (R., p.754.) The local office told the
officer to contact the company's Overland Park, Kansas office where the records are
stored. (R., p.754.)
On October 4, 2008, the officer obtained a search warrant from Nez Perce
County Magistrate Kalbfleisch for the electronically stored cell phone records of
Mr. Branigh. (R., p.754.) The search warrant listed the premises to be searched as
Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, located at 6480 Sprint
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Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736).

(R., p.754.)

Upon the

suggestion of the Kansas office of Nextel-Sprint, which the officer had contacted by
telephone, the officer faxed the search warrant to the fax number supplied and listed in
the warrant

(R., pp.754-55.)

The court took judicial notice that the area code 913

included Overland Park, Kansas.

(R., p.755.) Subsequently, the cell phone records

were provided by mail to the Lewiston City Police Department. (R., p.755.) However,
the records failed to include a letter of certification/authenticity so, on November 29,
2007, the officer obtained a second search warrant from Nez Perce County Magistrate
Gaskill for the records and a letter of certification/authenticity. (R., p.755.) The second
search warranted described the premises to be search identically to the first warrant.
(R., p.755.) The second warrant was then faxed to the fax number on the warrant as
supplied by Nextel-Sprint. (R., p.755.)
The district court noted that I.C. § 19-4408 and Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a) applied
to Mr. Branigh's claim, and concluded that, "barring authority that supercedes or trumps
the Rule I.C.R. 41 (a), of which the State has presented none, the Court finds the search
warrant, while lawfully obtained, was unlawfully executed and, as a result, the cell
phone records obtained by means of the search warrant were unlawfully obtained."
(R.. p.756.)

"Nevertheless, the Court's ruling does not foreclose admission of the

Defendant's cell phone records if the State can present records that are shown to be
lawfully obtained and a proper foundation for the admission of the records is
established." (R., p.756.)
The State then filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that, "authority for
both Federal and State Courts to issue extra-territorial search warrants is provided by
18 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. (the Electronic Communication Privacy Act)."
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(R., p.765.)

Additionally, the State asserted that Mr. Branigh lacked standing to contest the State's
obtaining of the records because, while, "the records may be about the Defendant, ...
they do not belong to him." (R., p.769.)
At the hearing on the State's motion for reconsideration, the district court
concluded that Mr. Branigh, as "an individual that entered into a cell phone provider
contract, does have standing to challenge a search warrant seeking the release of cell
phone records." (Tr., p.230, Ls.12-15.) On this point, Mr. Branigh agrees. However,
the district court then made the following decision with which Mr. Branigh very much
disagrees: "I am going to find that 18 USC 27-03 [sic] does provide a means of service
of a state search warrant to a provider such as Nextel in this case. And I'm therefore
going to reconsider and reverse my earlier decision." (Tr., p.231, Ls.9-13.) The court
then denied the motion in limine and permitted the cell phone records to be introduced,
provided the proper foundation was established.

(Tr., p.232, Ls.1-3.)

Mr. Branigh

submits that the district court erred by concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 expanded the
authority of an Idaho court to issue a warrant beyond that which is provided by Idaho
law.
While Mr. Branigh's motion was captioned as a motion in limine, in substance it
was a motion to suppress, asserting that Mr. Branigh's rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constituiton were violated.

(R., pp.306-07.)

In reviewing an order on a motion to

suppress evidence, this Court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206,207 (2009). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous but will freely review the trial court's application of
constitutional principles to the facts found. Id. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous
25

if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

State v. Bishop, 146

Idaho 804,810 (2009).
In this case, Mr. Branigh does not dispute the district court's factual findings, nor
does he disagree with the court's ruling that he had standing to bring his challenge to
the execution of the warrant. While Mr. Branigh also does not disagree with the district
court's initial conclusion that the records were not admissible, he disagrees with its
rationale.
improperly.

The court held that the warrant was lawfully obtained but was executed
(R., pp.755-756.)

Mr. Branigh contends that the warrant was unlawfully

obtained because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a warrant for premises
outside of the judicial district in which the magistrate resided. He also asserts that the
warrant was unlawfully executed because the warrant described the premises to be
searched as being in Texas, and the warrant was served in Kansas.

Mr. Branigh's

other point of contention is the district court's ruling that the federal statute expanded
the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant outside the State's jurisdiction.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

"Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth
Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit.'" State v. Ramos, 142
Idaho 628, 630 (Ct. App. 2005).
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Turning first to the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant for property that is
located in another state, Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a) states,
Authority to issue a warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule may
be issued by a district judge or magistrate within the judicial district
wherein the property or person sought is located upon request of a law
enforcement officer or any attorney for the state of Idaho.
I.C.R. 41(a). The rule clearly states that the issuing court must reside within the judicial
district where the property or person to be sought is located. Regardless of whether the
premises are in Texas or Kansas, they are outside the judicial district where the warrant
was sought. As the issuing magistrates lacked any authority to issue warrants outside
their judicial districts, the warrants were unlawfully obtained.
Further, the warrants were unlawfully executed, because, as the district court
found in this case, the search warrant listed the premises to be searched as Overland
Park, Texas and the warrants were served in Kansas. (R., pp.754-55.) An incorrect
address for a warrant to search a premise may invalidate a search warrant. Huck v.
State, 124 Idaho 155, 159 (Ct. App. 1993). And police have a duty under the Fourth
Amendment to provide the correct "particulars" describing the place to be searched to
the magistrate.

United States v. Collins, 830 F.2d 145, 145-146 (9 th Cir. 1987).

Because the warrants described the premises to be searched as being in Texas, and
the warrants were served in Kansas, they were unlawfully executed.
Thus, the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and executed.

They were

unlawfully obtained because the premises being searched were outside the judicial
district where the warrant was obtained, and they were unlawfully executed because
they were served in a different State than the State identified in the warrant. Because of
this, the district court properly ruled the records were inadmissible unless the State
could subsequently show that they were lawfully obtained.
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The State's motion for reconsideration did not make this showing. The State's
sole argument that the records were admissible was that the warrant process in this
case was made valid by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which provided,
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communications service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication that is in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the
offense under investigation or equivalent state warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).3 The State rightfully noted that, "the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not apply to state judges or state law enforcement."

(R., p.766.)

However, the State was incorrect in its assertion that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) had anything
to do with this case.
After citing the above-quoted portion of the statute, the State asserted that, "[a]
rather complete discussion of the reasoning behind the Federal Legislation is given In
the matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale,

3 The statute has since been amended to make it even clearer that a different standard
applies to state courts. It now states,
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court,
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent
jurisdiction. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or
electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty
days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009) (emphasis added).
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California 94089 (2007 US Dist, Ariz)." (R., p.767.) The State brought the following
quote to the district court's attention:
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and
prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the federal district
court for the district where the crime allegedly occurred to preside over
both the investigation and prosecution of that crime. Commentators have
suggested that one reason for the amendments effected by Section 220 of
the Patriot Act was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts
in the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of California
where major internet service providers ("ISPs") AOL and Yahoo,
respectively, are located. See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes and
E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet Swveillance Debate, 72
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 1613-15 (Aug.2004); Patricia L. Bellia,
Surveillance Law Through eyberlaw's Lens, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375,
1454 (Aug.2004) (stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the
responsibility for issuance of the order from the court where the service
provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the offense being
investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot Act, a disproportionate
number of such orders were issued in the Eastern District of Virginia,
where AOL is located."); Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the
Screenname: Handling Information Requests Relating to Electronic
Communications, 19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov.2002)
(stating that "[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on district
courts in which major communications providers are located, such as the
Northern District of California and Eastern District of Virginia."). Indeed,
the House Judiciary Committee's Report accompanying the USA Patriot
Act explains that § 2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative delays
caused by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm,
Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet
Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15, n. 80 (Aug.2004)
(citing H.R.Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57 (2001)). The Committee's Report
further explains that requiring an investigator to coordinate with agents,
prosecutors, and judges in the district where the ISP is located would
cause time delays that "could be devastating to an investigation,
especially where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id.
(emphasis added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal agent
investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to California or Virginia
to obtain an out-of-district search warrant from a California or Virginia
magistrate judge for electronically-stored communications WOUld, in my
view, unnecessarily increase the cost of federal investigations.
In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., 07-3194-MB, 2007 WL 1539971 (D. Ariz. May 21,2007).
This is all well and good, but it has absolutely nothing to do with whether Congress can
expand the warrant issuing power of an Idaho court. It is clear from the above quote
29

that the federal legislation was indeed aimed at streamlining the warranting process and
decreasing the costs - of federal investigations and prosecutions. What the Arizona
court was discussing was permitting a federal court in one federal district to issue a
warrant in another federal district.

Id.

This has absolutely nothing to do with the

question of whether Congress can alter the warrant issuing power of a state court.
Further, the federal legislation does not even intend to alter state warranting
procedures in the manner in which the State suggested to the district court. The statute
clearly permits a governmental entity to apply for a warrant, "issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent state warrant."
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U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the warrant must comply with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense (the section
that applies to the federal courts), or be an "equivalent state warrant," i.e., a state
warrant that complies with a state's warrant issuing procedure (the section that applies
to a state warrant.)
State's warrant

Because the federal legislation does not attempt to expand a

issuing

power,

but

rather orders

the

provider of electronic

communications services to comply with a state warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) does not
provide authority for a Nez Perce County magistrate to issue a warrant for premises in
Kansas or Texas.
Further, even if Congress intended to alter each state's criminal rules of
procedure, it would lack the power to do so. This Court should take umbrage at the
suggestion that Congress could, by federal legislation, do away with the Idaho Criminal
Rules.

It is this Court, not Congress, that promUlgates the Idaho Criminal Rules.
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I.C.R.1. These rules are invalid only to the extent they ever violate the United States or
Idaho Constitution. However, in the district court, the State asserted,
"[I]est there be any confusion about the referenced statute's applicability to
the states, the Court's opinion in Ameritech v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908;
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5941 discusses the issue regarding the applicability
of the ECPA to the states (in the context of 18 USC 2706, which deals
with the requirement that governmental entities are responsible for the
costs incurred by the service provider.)
(R., p.768). In McCann, the Seventh Circuit stated,

"A governmental entity" is considerably broader than "the federal
government." The point of § 2706 is not to distinguish the federal
government from other governments, but to distinguish the public from the
private sector. Any private actor who wants information from a phone
company will have to negotiate and pay for the service, when § 2702
allows disclosure at all. Governments have a power of compulsion, and §
2706 attaches a price tag to the use of that power, just as the
Constitution's takings clause requires compensation for other uses of
governmental power to obtain private property.
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not define the
term "governmental entity," it uses that phrase in several sections in ways
that make application to state and local governments unmistakable. For
example, § 2703 specifies how a "governmental entity" can go about
obliging a phone company to hand over records. The statute gives
examples, such as "an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena", §
2703(b)(1 )(8)(i). Other options include a "State warrant" (referred to in
three subsections) and a "Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena" (in
§ 2703(c)(2)). Then there is § 2703(d), which distinguishes what "a
State governmental authority" must do from how a federal
governmental body proceeds, an odd reference indeed if the
category "governmental entity" does not include states.
Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
Mr. 8ranigh does not assert that Idaho is not a "governmental entity," under the Act, but
it is one thing to assert that a governmental entity that seeks to use the authority of the
Act must compensate the provider, and quite another to assert that the entire Act
supercedes the Idaho Criminal Rules.

However, the McCann case provided by the

State does answer the question posed by this case - the Act preserves State
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sovereignty. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), cited by the McCann Court, provides: H[i]n the case of
a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the
law of such State."

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

In this case, the warrants were clearly

prohibited by the laws of Idaho, specifically I.C.R. 41 (a). Further, it was executed on an
address different than the address identified in the warrant.
The district court correctly concluded in its initial order that the phone records
were inadmissible unless the State could subsequently show that the warrants were
valid.

The State's only argument was the federal statute validated the issuance and

execution of the warrants. As set forth above, the federal statute does not, and cannot,
alter the Idaho Criminal Rules.

Because the Electronic Communication Privacy Act

does not apply to the facts of this case, the district court erred by granting the State's
motion for reconsideration.

At trial, evidence of these messages was presentend in

State's Exhibits 61 and 64; due to the fact that the court erred in granting the motion for
reconsideration, these specific exhibits should not have been admitted.

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, And 34 Because Their
Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice

A.

Introduction
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court erred by admitting State's Exhibits 32,

33, and 34 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
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B.

The District Court Erred By Admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, And 34 Because
Their Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair
Prejudice
Dr. Jay Hunter was working in the emergency room the night Mr. Johnston was

shot. (Tr., p.645, Ls.21-23.) When Mr. Johnston was brought in, Dr. Hunter started IVs,
took a chest x-ray, and inserted a chest tube.

(Tr., p.646, Ls.7-10.)

The State

submitted, over Mr. Branigh's objection, two photographs of bullet wounds and a
photograph of the drainage from the chest tube. (Tr., p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.11; State's
Exhibits 32, 33, and 34.)

Mr. Branigh objected on the basis that the exhibits were

unfairly prejudicial pursuant to IRE 403.

(Tr., p.647, Ls.12-15.)

The district court

overruled the objection, stating, "although there is some prejudicial impact, I do think
that the probative value is sufficient that I'm ... going to overrule that objection and
Exhibits 32, 33, and 34 will be admitted at this time."

(Tr., p.647, Ls.21-25.)

Mr. Branigh submits that the district court erred by admitting the exhibits.
Mr. Branigh acknowledges that he did not make a relevance objection. However,
any relevance to these exhibits was extremely low. There was no dispute in this case
that Mr. Johnston was shot in the chest and there was no dispute that the wounds
caused his death. The coroner testified, without objection, to those conclusions. The
only contested issue in this case was whether Mr. Branigh was the shooter.

These

photographs contribute nothing to this issue. The photographs, of bloody bullet wounds
and a chest tube full of blood, were unfairly prejudicial because they had no effect other
to appeal to the jury's sympathy.

Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be

excluded, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000).
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The trial court's I.R.E. 403

determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406
(1991 ),
To determine whether the district court's discretion has been abused, this Court
must ascertain: first, whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one
requiring the exercise of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and, third, whether the court reached its conclusion by
an exercise of reason. Zamora v. State, 123 Idaho 192, 194 (1992) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).

Evidence is not unfairly

prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. State v. Pokorney, 149
Idaho 459, 465 (Ct. App. 2010).

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests

decision on an improper basis. Id.
As set forth above, the district court did not engage in much of an analysis
regarding this issue, simply stating, "although there is some prejudicial impact, I do think
that the probative value is sufficient ... " (Tr., p.647, Ls.21-25.) While the district court
appears to have perceived the issue as one of discretion, Mr. Branigh asserts that the
court failed to reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason. As noted above, the
relevance of the photographs was, at best, minimal and, at worst, nonexistent. There
was no dispute as to the cause of death in this case, and photographs of bloody
wounds and a chest tube add nothing of relevance. The only effect the photographs
would have had was to appeal to the jury's passion by creating sympathy for
Mr. Johnston because of the state he was in when the photographs were taken.
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III.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct an IRE 404(b) Analysis

A.

Introduction
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his text

messages without undertaking the requisite analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as required by
law and by the district court's pretrial order in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct an IRE 404(b) Analysis
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that, prior to the admission of any Rule 404(b)

evidence, there would be a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the
relevancy of the evidence.

(Tr., p.183, Ls.1-25.) At trial, prior to the admission of a

series of text messages, Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of IRE 404(b). He made two
specific objections - to State's Exhibits 4 and 64. (Tr., p.512, L.2-9, p.804, Ls.10-17.)
Regarding Exhibit 4, the district court stated that Mr. Branigh had not demonstrated the
messages were subject to 404(b); regarding Exhibit 64, the court simply overruled the
Rule 404(b) exception. (Tr., p.515, L.15-19, p.804, Ls.18-25.) Because these exhibits
are lengthy, Mr. Branigh will not list out the messages in this brief. However, he asserts
that the district court erred by failing to recognize that these messages, many of them
quite prejudicial, fell within the scope of Rule 404(b) and by failing to determine their
relevancy outside of the presence of the jury.
Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a
permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52
(2009).

First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
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establish the other crime or wrong as fact. Id. The trial court must also determine
whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Id.
Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.

Id.

Such evidence is only

relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant
was the actor. Id.
Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under !.R.E. 403 and
determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value of the evidence.

Id.

This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial

judge. Id. The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility
on a case-by-case basis. Id.
In this case, the district court did not perceive the text messages as falling within
the cope of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, did not undertake the analysis required of it by
Grist.

Regarding Exhibit 4, Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of Rule 404(b).

The

district court stated that it had not been cited to anything "particular for 404(b)" and
overruled the objection. (Tr., p.515, Ls.17-1S.) The district court erred.
Mr. Branigh objected, and alerted the district court to the fact that the messages
were "404(b) evidence." (Tr., p.512, Ls.5-S.) While the district court stated that it had
been pointed to nothing in particular regarding Rule 404(b), Mr. Branigh's objection was
clear.

It is also clear that the messages were subject to Rule 404(b). The Court of

Appeals has recently noted,
Although Idaho appellate courts have commonly used the terms "prior bad
acts evidence" or "other bad acts evidence" as shorthand to refer to
evidence governed by Rule 404(b), we have noted that the rule is not
limited to "bad" acts. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91
(Ct.App.2011). We have also held, however, that if the evidence does not
bear upon the defendant's character, it is not subject to !.R.E. 404(b). Id.
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In Norton, the defendant was on trial for arson and sought exclusion of
evidence that she had previously experienced a house fire and collected
insurance. We held that evidence that Norton's house had burned and that
she received insurance, without any evidence that the fire was caused by
arson, did not implicate her character; and therefore was not excluded by
Rule 404(b). Id. at 190, 254 P.3d at 91.
In the present case, the State concedes on appeal that evidence of
Whitaker's pornography viewing could have been perceived by a jury as
reflecting negatively on his character. We agree. This evidence, while not
evincing criminality, could be used to demonstrate poor character.
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 2012). While the State was not offering

the text messages from Mr. Branigh's phone as evidence of criminal character, this
evidence could certainly be used to demonstrate poor character in the form of
inappropriate comments and threats. The evidence, by its very nature, is clearly within
the ambit of Rule 404(b) and Mr. Branigh was not required to elaborate any further in
his objection.
The text messages from Mr. Branigh's phone were clearly prior acts which could
reflect poorly on his character, and thus IRE 404(b) is applicable.

The district court

violated its own order, and the command in Grist that the court make factual findings
regarding whether the act could be proven or where it would be relevant. The district
court did none of these things, and therefore, the district court erred.

IV.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence
Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor in committed misconduct rising to the
level of a fundamental error when he argued facts that were not supported by any
evidence in the record.
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In cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial,
this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to the
level of a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In cases of
unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review.

First, the

defendant must demonstrate that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were
violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious from the record without the
need for additional information not contained within the record on appeal. Id. Finally,
the defendant must show the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. As to
this last prong, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the error
complained of affected the outcome of the trial.
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor in this case
attempted to induce the jury to render a verdict on factors other than the evidence when
he discussed the reasons why no testing was done on gun powder residue, none of
which was supported by the facts adduced at trial.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following representation to
the jury:
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was no
gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell
told you the lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove
anything. They result in a false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot,
all that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You
can't identify the gun, which it was anything like that. And so they have
taken the positive they will no longer do the testing.
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So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case there
wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things you might see on CSI, you
know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the sidewalk, no.
You know, No.1, it takes over a year in real world time to get the DNA
evidence back.
(Tr., p.1023, L.25 -p.1024, L.17.) During rebuttal, he stated:
GSR (gun shot residue) transfer is of the biggest problems that makes it
unreliable. And its situations where there is gunshots, it's highly likely that
there's more than one gun involved. So if they found gun shot residue, it
wouldn't have said anything.
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that that
was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any more
that it was evidence that is was GSR transfer from all the - well, as a
matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun shot
residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of them
takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle their
guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons that
are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the
Defendant regardless of what he says.
(Tr., p.1040, Ls.7-22.) None of this is supported by evidence adduced at trial.
These statements, calculated to alleviate the jury's concern as to why testing was
not done, misled the jury regarding the facts. See also State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570
(Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental
error where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and appealed to
the passions and prejudice of the jury).
These due process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are
clear violations of well-established law. Accordingly, there is every reason to believe
the prosecutor's improper argument affected the outcome in this case.

One of

Mr. Branigh's arguments at trial was that he did not own a gun, was not found with a
gun, and no gun was found at the hill where Mr. Peak claimed Mr. Branigh told him that
he had hidden a gun.

The prosecutor was clearly concerned that Mr. Branigh might
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argue that the lack of gun shot residue testing might sway the jury, because he
emphasized the lack of evidence of residue in both his initial and rebuttal arguments.
Considering that a lack of residue on Mr. Branigh could corroborate his assertion that he
did not own a gun, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's statements did not affect the
outcome of the trial.

The prosecutor clearly committed misconduct and this Court

should vacate Mr. Branigh's conviction as a result.

V.
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When He Failed To
Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial

A.

Introduction
One of the State's primary witnesses at Mr. Branigh's trial, Mr. Peak, testified

falsely before the jury that his relationship with former Nez Perce County Sheriff Dorion
was one of mere acquaintance, and that he knew the officer only due to the fact that the
former Sheriff was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's high school. The prosecutor in this
case knew, or had reason to know, that this testimony was false but failed to correct the
testimony at trial. Because this evidence was material to Mr. Branigh's case, he asserts
that due process requires reversal of his conviction.

B.

Clarification Of Standard Of Review For Mr. Branigh's Claim Of A Due Process
Violation Due To The Presentation Of False Testimony By One Of The State's
Witness
Mr. Branigh concedes that he did not object to the false testimony presented by

Mr. Peak at trial, as he did not become aware of evidence showing Mr. Peak's
testimony to be false until after he had already been convicted. Normally a defendant
raising a claim of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in a due process violation for the
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first time on appeal must meet the three-part test articulated in Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
However, under the unique facts of this case and the distinctive harm that results when
a defendant is convicted partly through the presentation of false testimony, Mr. Peak
asserts that this Court should review his claim of a due process violation directly, as he
could not have raised any objection at trial.
In most cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at
trial, this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to
the level of a fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. First, the defendant must
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were
violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious from the record without the
need for additional information not contained within the record on appeal. Id. Finally,
the defendant (in most instances) must show the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights. Id. As to this last prong, the defendant must show a reasonable
possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial.
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the three-part test for unobjected to
errors, in part, as a matter of policy to encourage the making of timely objections before
the trial court. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. This policy was adopted both to permit the
trial court the opportunity to consider claims of error, and to prevent a defendant from
"sandbagging the court," - i.e., remaining silent regarding his or her objections and only
belatedly raising the issue if the trial does not result in the defendant's favor. Id. at 224.
Such a concern is not present under the unique facts of this case, however, because
Mr. Branigh could not have known that Mr. Peak's testimony was false until after his trial
had already concluded, as this was the only point in time when the State disclosed the
evidence that demonstrated its falsity. Accordingly, under the unique facts of this case
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- where the evidence showing the error is only demonstrated at a stage of the
underlying criminal proceedings that follows the defendant's trial - Mr. Branigh asserts
that the three-part test for fundamental error under Perry should not apply and that this
Court should directly review his claim on appeal.
However, Mr. Branigh asserts that, even if the three-part test from Perry is
deemed to apply to his case, this standard has been met given the prosecutor's failure
to correct false testimony from a key witness for the State.

C.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When He Failed To
Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial
Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor in this case violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process at his trial when he knowingly failed to correct false
testimony that was tendered by Mr. Peak, who was one of the State's witnesses at trial. 4
H[A] conviction that is obtained through the use of false evidence, known to be
such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). The same result is required when the State

fails to correct false testimony, even if the testimony was unsolicited by the State. Id. In
addition, it makes no difference if the false testimony is relevant only to impeachment of
a witness or the credibility of the parties:
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
4 Mr. Branigh's claim of a due process violation through the prosecutor's failure to
correct false testimony is distinct from his claim of a Brady violation in this appeal.
While the focus of a claim of a Brady violation is on the evidence that was withheld from
the defendant, a claim of a due process violation for the failure to correct false testimony
focuses instead on the nature of the evidence that the jury was permitted to receive.
See Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649.
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determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
the possible interest of a witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life
or liberty may depend.
Id.; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1972); Sivak v. State, 134
Idaho 641, 649 (2000).
"A defendant establishes a Napue violation upon showing: (1) the testimony was
false; (2) the prosecutor knew or should have known it was false; and (3) the testimony
was materiaL" State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (2010). When the credibility of a
witness may be the determining factor in the jury's finding of guilt or innocence, false
testimony affecting the witness' credibility justifies a new trial regardless of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649. Because cases where
the State knowingly relies upon false evidence in procuring a conviction "involve a
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process," such a conviction must be
reversed where there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104
(1976)). "[T]he fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless the failure to
disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,680 (1985)).
As to the first prong of the test for a Napue violation, the record shows that
Mr. Peak provided false testimony at Mr. Branigh's trial.
Mr.

During trial, when asked by

Branigh what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak

characterized the officer as only an acquaintance and further responded that he only
knew the former Sheriff as, "a resource officer at my high schooL" (Tr., p.890, L.24 p.891, L.2.) This testimony was false, as the relationship between the former Sheriff
and Mr. Peak went far beyond mere acquaintance; and Mr. Peak did not know former
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Sheriff Dorion as a resource officer from his school, but rather was intimately
acquainted with the former Sheriff and had used the officer to obtain inside information
contained in law enforcement databases.
Mr. Peak subsequently admitted at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new
trial that his trial testimony was not accurate.

(Supp. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.9.)

Beyond Mr. Peak's own acknowledgement, the record in this case shows demonstrably
that Mr. Peak's testimony was false.
conversations between

During several of the recorded phone

Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff, Mr. Dorion ended the

conversation by telling Mr. Peak, "I love you"; and, on at least one occasion, Mr. Peak
returned this sentiment.

(Supp. Ex., pp.69-76.)

Additionally, multiple interviews

between Mr. Peak and a federal agent revealed the extent of this relationship.
Mr. Peak had told the federal agent that his relationship with the former Sheriff
was "very good," and that Mr. Dorion was a "father figure" for him. (Supp. Ex., pAS.)
Former Sheriff Dorion let Mr. Peak drive his car and had arranged for Mr. Peak to live
with him upon Mr. Peak's release from jail. (Supp. Ex., pAS.) Additionally, the former
Sheriff engaged in a repeated pattern of permitting Mr. Peak unauthorized access to
information from the law enforcement database used by the Nez Perce County Sheriff's
Office.

(Supp. Ex., ppAS-64.)

The former Sheriff even, at times, kept Mr. Peak's

criminal activities secret from other law enforcement officers and advised Mr. Peak as to
how to avoid criminal liability for his charged offenses. (Supp. Ex., ppAS-64.) This is
not evidence that shows a relationship of mere acquaintance, and this relationship very
clearly extended beyond the fact that former Sheriff Dorion happened to have been a
resource officer at Mr. Peak's high school. Accordingly, Mr. Peak's testimony at trial to
that effect was false.
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In addition, the prosecutor in this case knew or reasonably should have known
that this was false testimony. From the outset, Mr. Spickler testified at the hearing on
Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial that he knew Mr. Peak was not telling the whole
truth when he classified his relationship with former Sheriff Dorion as being merely one
of acquaintance. (Supp. Tr., p.50, Ls.3-13.) Beyond this, evidence of the information
provided by Mr. Spickler to a federal agent in connection with the investigation relating
to the former Sheriff demonstrates that the prosecutor had fairly extensive knowledge
as to the inappropriate relationship between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report from Mr. Spickler's
meeting with the federal agent, the agent arranged the meeting after an Idaho State
Police officer was contacted by Mr. Spickler regarding the inappropriate relationship
between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff. (Supp. R., p.214.) During this meeting, the
prosecutor voiced several concerns about allegations he had heard about former Sheriff
Dorion. (Supp. R., p.214.) Mr. Peak was mentioned specifically by the prosecutor - in
particular, Mr. Spickler stated that a number of people had spoken to him about the
"close, personal relationship" between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion.

(Supp.

R., p.215.) Also noted in this report was the fact that, "LPD 5 Officers have expressed

great concern to Spickler about Peak's relationship with Dorion." (Supp. R., p.215.) In
fact, Mr. Spickler's concerns were so significant that he agreed that the proper action
based upon the reports he had received was to contact the Idaho State Attorney
General's Office to request that they take over the matter for potential prosecution.
(Supp. R., p.216.)

"LPD" is an abbreviation used within the FBI report for the Lewiston Police
Department. (Supp. R., p.215.)

5
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Not only did Mr. Spickler knowingly fail to correct the false testimony tendered by
Mr. Peak, the prosecutor instead vouched for Mr. Peak's credibility and the truthfulness
of his testimony during closing arguments. The prosecutor characterized Mr. Peak as
being, "as honest as he could be," during his testimony at trial. (Tr., p.1038, Ls.10-11.)
Mr. Spickler further emphasized Mr. Peak's purported motive in giving his testimony at
trial - i.e., that he was testifying only because "it's the right thing to do." (Tr., p.1038,
L.14.) After noting that Mr. Peak had testified before the jury under oath, the prosecutor
went on to state that, "there is no evidence that what Steven Peak said wasn't true, the
evidence was exactly the opposite." (Tr., p.1 038, L.11 - p.1 039, L.8.)
Finally, this perjured testimony was material to issues relating to Mr. Peak's
credibility at trial, and therefore created a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury. Mr. Peak's testimony in this case was a
critical component to the evidence against Mr. Branigh. The district court, in denying
Mr. Branigh's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, noted
that the only evidence that could potentially directly link Mr. Branigh to the charged
offense came through Mr. Peak's testimony.

(Tr., p.911, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor

also emphasized Mr. Peak's testimony in closing arguments as filling a significant
evidentiary gap in the State's case - Mr. Peak provided the only evidence that could
connect Mr. Branigh to any firearm. (Tr., p.1 037, L.21 - p.1 038, L.2.)
Moreover, Mr. Peak testified at trial as to several damaging admissions that
Mr. Branigh had supposedly made regarding the charged offense. (Tr., p.879, L.24 p.880, L.1, p.884, LS.7 -24, p.885, Ls.2-9.)

Given that there were no witnesses who

actually saw Mr. Branigh at the scene of Mr. Johnston's shooting and no evidence that
tied Mr. Branigh to any firearm aside from Mr. Peak's testimony, the credibility of
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Mr. Peak was a crucial component of the State's evidence against Mr. Branigh and of
the jury's assessment of his guilt.
In sum, under clearly established case law, due process requires reversal of a
conviction that is obtained by the State where the jury is presented with testimony that
the prosecutor knew or should have known was false; and where the testimony was
material, meaning that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury.6 Mr. Peak in this case presented false testimony
that had direct and significant bearing on his credibility. The prosecutor in this case also
knew or reasonably should have known that this testimony was false based upon
reports from law enforcement officers as to the close and inappropriate relationship
between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion. And there is a reasonable likelihood that
this false information affected the jury's verdict given the centrality of

Mr. Peak's

testimony to the State's proof at trial and the corresponding importance of his credibility
as a witness for the State. In light of this, Mr. Branigh submits that due process requires
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

VI.

The District Court Erred And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial
When It Denied His Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Brady Violation That
Occurred In This Case

A

Introduction
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a

This Court may wish to note that the test for materiality set forth in Sivak is virtually
identical to the standard for prejudice under the three-part test set forth in Perry. Perry,
150 Idaho at 226; Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649. Accordingly, because Mr. Branigh has
established that the false testimony provided by Mr. Peak at trial was material - i.e., that
there is a reasonably possibility that the testimony could have affected the jury - he has
also demonstrated the requisite showing for prejudice under Perry.
6
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new trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment
evidence. Critically, the district court in this case found that Mr. Branigh had met all of
the elements to establish a Brady violation, but thereafter erroneously determined that
he was not entitled to a new trial based upon its conclusion that the remaining evidence
- aside from the testimony of Mr. Peak - was sufficient to convict Mr. Branigh. This
holding is clearly inconsistent with controlling case law from the United States Supreme
Court.

Because the district court failed to act in accordance with the constitutional

standards governing its determination as to whether to grant a new trial based upon the
due process violation in this case, Mr. Branigh asserts that this Court should reverse the
district court's order denying his motion for a new trial.

B.

The District Court Erred And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair
Trial When It Denied His Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Bradv
Violation That Occurred In This Case
From the outset, the district court in this case determined that, "[i]n the instant

matter, Defendant Branigh has met his burden as to all three components of a Brady
violation." (Supp. R, p.475.) The district court correctly found that the evidence relating
to Mr. Peak's relationship with former Sheriff Dorion was "clearly impeachment
evidence" because the evidence not disclosed to Mr. Branigh "provided Peak the
opportunity to obtain confidential police investigation information from police sources
rather than from fellow inmates." (Supp. R, p.475.) Likewise, the district court correctly
found that this information was not disclosed to Mr. Branigh due to the prosecutor's
erroneous belief that the evidence was immaterial, and despite the fact that Mr. Spickler
was clearly aware of the investigation into the relationship between former Sheriff
Dorion and Mr. Peak.

(Supp. R, pp.475-476.)

Finally, the district court correctly

concluded that, "there can be little doubt that Branigh was prejudiced by the withholding
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of evidence that carried such palpable impeachment value."

(Supp. R., p.476.)

Mr. Branigh concurs with this portion of the district court's analysis.
However, rather than order a new trial based upon the finding that a Brady
violation had occurred, the district court denied his request for a new trial based upon
the conclusion that, "[w]hen the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining
evidence presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have reached a
verdict of guilty." (Supp. R., pp.480-481.)

Due to the court's view that the remaining

evidence was sufficient, and therefore that Mr. Branigh had not demonstrated that he
would have likely been acquitted in the absence of Mr. Peak's testimony, the district
court held that Mr. Branigh had not established that the Brady violation found by the
court merited a new trial. This was clear error.
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the
government the duty to disclose evidence in its possession which, if revealed, would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial."

State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 321 (Ct. App.

1993). The State's duty to disclose evidence applies to impeachment evidence as well
as exculpatory evidence.

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.

Impeachment evidence is

"'favorable to the accused,' so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the
difference

between

conviction

and

acquittal."

Id.

(internal

citations omitted).

Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, regardless of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. For purposes of
determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, the terms "material" and
"prejudicial" are used interchangeably. See United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911
n.12 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The obligation of the State to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant exists
regardless of whether a defendant has specifically requested disclosure of the
information from the State. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Accordingly,
constitutional error results from the suppression of favorable evidence by the
government "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. (quoting
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).

The United States Supreme Court in Kyles took pains at several points in its
Opinion to emphasize that the pertinent test for whether the failure of the State to
disclose favorable evidence requires reversal on due process grounds is not whether
the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction or that the disclosure of
the suppressed evidence would have likely resulted in an acquittal.

"Although the

constitutional duty [of disclosure] is triggered by the potential impact of the favorable
evidence, a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable
doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the
defendant)." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added).
The district court's ruling in this case that Mr. Branigh met all of the elements to
establish a Brady violation, but was not entitled to a new trial because the remaining
evidence aside from Mr. Peak's testimony was sufficient to convict him and he had
therefore not demonstrated that he would have likely been acquitted, runs directly afoul
of the Kyles Opinion. (Supp. R., pp.480-481.) The Kyles Court held:
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not
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whether a defendant would have more likely than not received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial."
The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it
is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. The defendant need not
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light
of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left
to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not
imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a
Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence
should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.
Kyles, 514 U.S, at 434-435 (emphasis added); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 289-290 (1999); Grube v, State, 134 Idaho 24, 28 (2000).
It would appear that the district court in this case actually merged the statutory
requirements for a new trial based upon I.C, § 19-2406 with the constitutional standards
for when a new trial is required due to a Brady violation.?

(Supp. R., pp.473-481.)

However, these claims are analytically distinct - a claim of a Brady violation is rooted in
the constitutional protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the
minimum standards established by the U.S, Supreme Court are controlling over when a
new trial is required due to the constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d
972, 984-985 (9th Cir. 2005). In contrast, entitlement to a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406
is a matter of statutory law - while Idaho may, by statute, provide additional grounds for
which a defendant may be entitled to a new trial, it may not impose a higher standard of

? Mr. Branigh alleged in the briefing in support of his motion for a new trial both that he
should receive a new trial based upon the Brady violation that occurred in this case and
because the evidence withheld by the State constituted newly discovered evidence
justifying a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.201-208.)
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proof to establish a constitutional violation. See State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471
(2000) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court establishes the "floor" of constitutional
protection, although the states are free to adopt greater protection under their state
constitutions); see a/so Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
In addition, Mr. Branigh actually pointed out to the district court that the court was
erroneously applying the standards for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406 to his claim of a

Brady violation in his motion for reconsideration. (Supp. R., pp.492-494.) However, the
district court denied this motion by reiterating that the court remained, "of the opinion
that if the testimony of Stephen Peak was completely removed from the record, the
remaining evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict." (Supp. R., p.519.)
The district court in this case found that Mr. Branigh had established all of the
elements of a Brady violation. This should have ended the court's analysis, as once a
violation of due process under the principles articulated in Brady has been established,
the remedy is a new trial. However, the district court erroneously held that Mr. Branigh
had not established a likelihood that he would have been acquitted and that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction in the absence of Mr. Peak's testimony.
Both points of the district court's analysis are directly in conflict with controlling U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Mr. Branigh asks that this Court reverse the
district court's order denying his motion for a new trial and remand this case for further
proceedings.
VII.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Pursuant
To I.C. § 19-2406 In Light Of Newly Discovered Evidence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Branigh further asserts that the district court applied the incorrect legal
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standards to his alternate request for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(7). Given that Mr. Peak recanted his trial testimony during
the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, Mr. Branigh contends that the district
court should have applied the standards set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in
State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380 (1985), in adjudicating his motion for a new trial.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2406 In Light Of Newly Discovered Evidence Because The
District Court Failed To Apply The Correct Legal Standards To This Motion
Idaho Code § 19-2406 enumerates the statutory grounds upon which a

defendant may seek a new trial, and these grounds include where new evidence is
discovered that is material to the defendant and which the defendant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial.

I.C. § 19-2604(7).

Generally, motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are governed
by the four-part test articulated in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976). Under
this test, a motion based on newly discovered evidence must establish: (1) that the
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2)
that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it would
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of the evidence was due to no
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Id. (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)).
While the Drapeau test governs most motions seeking a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence, a different test applies where the "new evidence" at issue is
the recantation by a trial witness of his or her prior trial testimony. In such cases, the
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Idaho Supreme Court adopted the rationale of a Seventh Circuit case 8 in holding that a
motion for a new trial should be granted when: (1) a government witness's testimony is
false; (2) without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different result; and
(3) the defendant did not know of, or could not adequately respond to, the false
testimony at the time of trial. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385. Both the Idaho Court of
Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that the Scroggins standard applies
"when a trial witness has recanted his or her trial testimony and evidence of that
recantation has been presented to the trial court." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73; State v.
Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366 (Ct. App. 2007).
Among the differences between the Drapeau and Scroggins standards is that the
former precludes a new trial unless a different result is 'probable,' while the latter
requires only that a different result is possible. See Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366 ; State v.
Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 578 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152
(Ct. App. 1986).

Obviously then, the Scroggins standard imposes a less onerous

burden on the defendant seeking a new trial than does the Drapeau standard. This less
exacting standard of prejudice is due to the fact that false testimony "affects the integrity
of the judicial process in a way that overlooked testimony does not." Lawrence, 112
Idaho at 151. Additionally, under the Scroggins standard, there is no requirement that
the testimony that is recanted be material rather than impeaching, as is required under
the Drapeau test. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385; Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691.

The case relied upon by the Court in Scroggins was Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d
82 (7th Cir. 1928). Although Larrison was overruled by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004), no Idaho
court has repudiated the Scroggins standard. See, e.g., Griffith, 144 Idaho at 365-67,
161 P.3d at 684-86 (recognizing the continued viability of Scroggins even after the
Seventh Circuit's overruling of Larrison).
8

54

In this case, Mr. Peak, in his testimony at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for
a new trial, repudiated his prior testimony at trial regarding the nature of his relationship
with former Sheriff Dorion. At trial, Mr. Peak classified his relationship with the former
Sheriff as mere acquaintances who were only known to one another through the fact
that Mr. Dorion was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's school. (Tr., p.890, L.24 - p.891,
L.2.) However, Mr. Peak admitted at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial
that they were more than acquaintances and that his testimony to that effect at
Mr. Branigh's trial was not the full truth. (Supp. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.9.) In fact, he
testified at this hearing that he and former Sheriff Dorion had a personal relationship Mr. Peak admitted that he spoke frequently with the then-Sheriff while he was
incarcerated; that he had asked former Sheriff Dorion for numerous favors, most notably
for assistance in seeking to avoid criminal consequences for Mr. Peak's offenses; that
the former Sheriff had permitted Mr. Peak personal access to the law enforcement
database over a dozen times; that Mr. Peak and Mr. Dorion had discussed
Mr. Branigh's case in particular "several times"; and that the two maintained a close
enough relationship to exchange sentiments of love at the end of their phone
conversations. (Supp. Tr., p.81, L.5 - p.90, L.17.)
The testimony by Mr. Peak at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial
constitutes a recantation of his prior trial testimony regarding the nature of his
relationship with former Sheriff Dorion.

Accordingly, the district court should have

applied the standards set forth in Scroggins when adjudicating Mr. Branigh's motion for
a new trial as it related to I.C. § 19-2406(7).

However, the court did not do so and

instead relied upon the standards contained within the Drapeau test. (Supp. R., pp.477481.) The district court's error in failing to apply the Scroggins test was crucial to the
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court's disposition of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, as both grounds upon which
the district court denied the motion are areas of divergence between the Scroggins and
Drapeau tests.

While the district court correctly found that the evidence regarding the
relationship between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff was newly discovered and was
unknown to Mr. Branigh at the time of trial, and that the failure to learn of the evidence
was not due to a lack of diligence on Mr. Branigh's part, the court denied Mr. Branigh's
motion because it found that this evidence was merely impeaching and because
Mr. Branigh had not shown that it was likely that this evidence would have produced an
acquittal.

(Supp. R., pp.477-481.) However, under the test articulated in Scroggins,

there is no requirement that the evidence subject to the witness' recantation be
sUbstantive rather than material.

Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385.

Additionally, a

defendant under the Scroggins standard need not demonstrate a reasonable probability
of an acquittal due to the newly discovered evidence - the mere possibility of a different
result is sufficient. Id.
Where the district court fails to apply the proper standards to its determination of
whether to grant a new trial, and, in particular, fails to apply the standards articulated in
Scroggins where the new evidence is the recantation of trial testimony by a witness, the

proper remedy is to vacate the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial and to
remand the case for further proceedings under the proper legal standards. Lawrence,
112 Idaho at 153. "When a judge exercises a discretionary function, such as ruling on a
motion for a new trial, and in doing so he applies an incorrect legal standard, the proper
appellate response is to vacate the ruling and remand the case for reconsideration." Id.
As such, Mr. Branigh asks that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his
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motion for a new trial and remand his case for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Branigh requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that the district court's

order denying his motion for a new trial be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2012.

JUS IN M. CURTIS
qeputyState Appellate Public Defender
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